Measuring the erosion of debt by Shipman, Arthur F.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Measuring the erosion of debt
Arthur F. Shipman
The New Arthurian Economics
August 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40696/
MPRA Paper No. 40696, posted 16. August 2012 12:27 UTC
1 
 
 
 
 
Measuring the Erosion of Debt 
 
Arthur Shipman 
The New Arthurian Economics 
http://newarthurianeconomics.blogspot.com/ 
 
 
15 August 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
The calculation used for the inflation-adjustment of debt often produces incorrect 
results. With Debt and GDP adjusted by the same calculation and for the same 
inflation, the Debt/GDP ratio after adjustment must be equal to the ratio before 
adjustment. A graph comparing the ratio of nominals to the ratio of reals would show 
them to be identical. Such a graph will show no erosion of debt. But this is absurd. 
Instead, let each year's addition to debt be adjusted for inflation separately. Then the 
ratio of reals will run higher than the ratio of nominals, and will react to changes in 
inflation. It is a simple matter, then, to measure the erosion of debt. 
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Introduction 
 
The typical inflation-adjustment of GDP takes the total dollar value of one year's 
output and converts it to the dollar value for another year. To do this is fairly 
simple: divide the one year's price number out of the GDP, and multiply the other 
year's price into it. 
 
For example, if a basket of goods used to cost $80 but now 
costs $125, take GDP now, divide by the current price, and 
multiply by the old price. That’s it. 
 
This calculation is used all the time to figure what economists 
call "real GDP”. But something goes wrong when we figure 
”real debt” that way. 
 
Consider one particular year. The new debt created that year 
should be adjusted the same way GDP is adjusted for that 
year: Divide by that year’s price level, and multiply by some 
base-year price. But this is precisely where the commonly used 
calculation goes wrong. 
 
The problem is that the total debt number for any one year does not include only 
new debt created that year. It also includes a lot of old debt left over from previous 
years. But the current year's price number is relevant only for the current year's 
additions to debt. For older debt included in the current balance, you have to use 
price numbers from prior years. 
 
A useful technique is to separate the new debt from the old. Then, inflation-adjust 
the new debt for the year just the same way you would inflation-adjust the GDP for 
that year. Next, look at the old debt that you didn't adjust yet, pull out the most 
recent year's debt remaining in it, and inflation-adjust that year's debt using that 
year's price number. 
 
And then keep doing that, stepping back a year and adjusting just the one year's 
debt the same way you would figure real GDP for that year, then stepping back 
another year. You go back as far as you can go, adjusting each year's debt 
separately, and add them up at the end. 
 
This method may be called the "incremental adjustment” of debt. 
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Context and Relevance 
 
I don't mean to harp on it. But a lot of people seem to think you can adjust debt for 
inflation the same way you adjust GDP for inflation1. You cannot. It works for GDP, 
because GDP is a measure of one year's output. It doesn't work for debt, because 
any one year's debt is almost certainly an accumulation of many years' deficits. 
 
Paul Krugman recently used this graph in a “Conscience of a Liberal” blog post: 
 
 
 
 
 
Krugman2 and Scott Sumner3 and Marcus Nunes4 and Joshua Wojnilower5 all 
discussed this graph. 
 
Krugman sees "a dramatic rise in household debt, which many of us now believe 
lies at the heart of our continuing depression." 
 
Sumner says "I suppose it’s in the eye of the beholder, but I see three big debt 
surges:  1952-64, 1984-91, and 2000-08." 
                                            
1 One example: Figure 1 of http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2009/el2009-16.html 
2 http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/18/thirty-troubling-years/ 
3 http://www.themoneyillusion.com/?p=15389 
4 http://thefaintofheart.wordpress.com/2012/07/18/to-really-understand-the-depression-we-have-to-
stop-pulling-red-herrings-from-the-hat/ 
5 http://bubblesandbusts.blogspot.com/2012/07/debt-surges-dont-cause.html 
Figure 1: Krugman's Graph 
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Nunes writes, "Why does the share of debt rise? I believe it reflects peoples 
‘optimism’ about future prospects... During the 1950s and first half of the 1960s we 
observe a rise in household debt. People felt good about the future... Note, 
however, that as soon as inflation begins to trend up in the second half of the 60s, 
the future doesn´t look so bright anymore. Households don´t increase 
indebtedness..." 
 
And, when Sumner reports that the first two debt surges were followed by golden 
ages and the third by a severe recession, and then asks "What was different with 
the third case?", Joshua Wojnilower responds: 
 
“The difference is the aggregate amount of household debt compared with 
incomes... As the aggregate amount of debt rises ...an increasing 
percentage of income and savings becomes necessary to cover interest 
costs and... pay back previous debt. These actions reduce the amount of 
income and savings available for consumption and investment, creating a 
drag on economic growth.” 
 
Wojnilower doesn't read anything into the graph. He doesn't chop it up into surges 
and remissions the way Sumner does. He doesn't attribute the surges to optimism, 
the way Nunes does. He doesn't even describe the increase as "dramatic" the way 
Krugman does. Wojnilower says only that debt grew to a very high level, then lays 
out a scenario to identify some troubles that may arise from excessive debt. 
 
By contrast, Sumner presents a relaxed, eye-of-the-beholder evaluation of the 
graph. He points out “three big debt surges" and the remission of debt growth 
following each. And yes, if you glance at the graph, you can see those surges. 
 
But Sumner's evaluation of the graph is too relaxed, and he misses an important 
detail. He puts the end of the first surge at 1964, and the start of the second at 
1984. As luck would have it, Allan Meltzer6 puts the start of the Great Inflation at 
1965, and its end at 1984. The Great Inflation fits snugly between the first two of 
Sumner's surges. 
 
Could Sumner have failed to notice? With all the ruckus these days, all the call for 
policymakers to raise the inflation target from 2% to 4% or more to inflate debt 
away, I don't see how he could possibly have overlooked the Great Inflation.  
 
The Great Inflation significantly reduced the burden of debt relative to GDP. That 
is the reason the graph appears to show remission between Sumner's first and 
second surges. 
 
                                            
6 http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/05/03/part2/Meltzer.pdf 
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Sumner might be thinking that the inflation in the numerator and denominator of 
Krugman's ratio cancel each other out. If that was the case, however, there could 
be no such thing as the erosion of debt by inflation. 
 
 
Ada and Ida 
 
To establish a frame of reference, I wanted to be sure I could duplicate Krugman’s 
graph. This step is almost unnecessary, as the St. Louis Fed’s FRED graphs are 
so well documented. 
 
 
 
 
Not bad. If you see differences, it is because I downloaded annual data from 
FRED, and Krugman probably used the default quarterly data. Both graphs show 
the same "face" in profile -- a nose in the 1980s, a chin before that, a neck in the 
early 1960s. Even a suggestion of eyes and hair can be seen in the graph. 
 
CMDEBT, by the way, is short for “Household Credit Market Debt Outstanding” 
from FRED, the Federal Reserve Economic Data service of the St. Louis Fed. 
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Figure 2: My version of Krugman's Graph 
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Next, a look at the raw debt numbers, along with "real debt" numbers figured by 
aggregate adjustment, the same way "real GDP" is figured: 
 
 
 
 
The relation between the two lines shown on Figure #3 is similar to the relation 
between Nominal GDP and Real GDP, which you have probably seen many times. 
The two lines cross in 2005, because the price deflator used for the conversion 
has 2005 as its base year. The red line is higher than the blue in the years before 
2005, and the blue line is higher in the years after 2005, because of inflation. 
 
Suppose you wanted to use this graph to learn something about inflation's ability 
to "erode" debt. In 2005 the lines cross. The real and nominal values are equal in 
2005. In other words, as of 2005 there had been no erosion of debt, despite all the 
inflation between 1950 and 2005.  
 
That is wrong, of course. But it is what the graph shows. 
 
The calculation used to figure "real" debt is incorrect. Aggregate adjustment is 
valid for flows like GDP, but not for stocks like debt. 
CMDEBT and "Real" CMDEBT (1 of 2)
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Next, the same graph again, but this time using incremental inflation adjustment to 
adjust each year’s debt separately, as is appropriate for a stock like debt: 
 
 
 
 
Here, real debt is significantly higher than nominal debt at every point on the 
graph. The red line is higher than the blue by the amount that debt was eroded by 
inflation. If you want to see the effect that inflation has on debt, this graph shows it. 
Incremental Data Adjustment (IDA) shows it.7 
 
 
The Simple Things 
 
Now we can look again at CMDEBT relative to GDP, the relation we started with. 
But I want to look at this relation three different ways. 
 
I want to see nominal CMDEBT divided by nominal GDP. This is the same version 
that Krugman showed in his graph. 
 
                                            
7 Figures 2 through 4 and the relevant numbers are available in the Google Docs spreadsheet at 
this awkward URL: 
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0Aupyd4Usl6QkdHZ6S0N3WWU5TXNMcHFma0Nr
Q1JsbGc 
Figure 4: Nominal and Incrementally Adjusted Real 
CMDEBT and "Real" CMDEBT (2 of 2)
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I want to see real CMDEBT divided by real GDP, where real CMDEBT is figured 
by ADA (Aggregate Data Adjustment), just as real GDP is figured. 
 
And I want to see real CMDEBT divided by real GDP, where real CMDEBT is 
figured by IDA or Incremental Data Adjustment. 
 
The first two can be done in FRED: 
 
 
 
The blue line shows nominal debt divided by nominal GDP. The red line shows 
real debt divided by real GDP. 
 
The blue line in Figure 5 is almost entirely hidden by the red line. I started the red 
line just a bit late, and stopped it just a bit early, so you can see there actually is a 
blue line on the graph. 
 
The two lines are identical. 
 
The blue line shows CMDEBT relative to GDP using "nominal" values, exactly as 
Krugman has it on his graph. I even multiplied by 100, as Krugman did, to convert 
the ratio values to percent values. (The "99.993" in the second formula is the price 
number for 2005, the base year for FRED's GDPDEF series.) 
 
The red line shows CMDEBT relative to GDP using "real" values. Debt is adjusted 
on this graph by ADA, the same inflation-adjustment calculation that is used all the 
time for figuring real GDP. In other words, GDP and CMDEBT are adjusted the 
Figure 5: Two Lines in the Same Location 
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same way and for the same amount of inflation. As a result, the Debt/GDP ratio 
after adjustment is equal to the ratio before adjustment, and the red line ends up in 
exactly the same location as the blue line. 
 
Figure 5 shows absolutely no "erosion" of debt resulting from inflation. But this is 
absurd. The inflation adjustment of debt on this graph is certainly wrong. 
 
The above graph shows only that anything divided by itself equals one. 
 
REAL/REAL = 1 = NOMINAL/NOMINAL 
 
Perhaps this is the relation Scott Sumner had in mind when he ignored the effect 
of inflation on debt for the 1964-1984 period. 
 
Sumner's "three surges" analysis of Krugman's graph, though seemingly accurate 
on its face, is deeply flawed. The analysis ignores the effect of inflation on debt. It 
pretends there is no such thing as erosion of debt. It misinterprets the effect of 
inflation, reading it as a significant reduction in new borrowing. 
 
Marcus Nunes then builds upon Sumner's error, creating a plausible story about 
optimism to explain the reduction in new borrowing during the Great Inflation. But 
this reduction in new borrowing is something that did not actually happen. 
 
If the simple things are not laid out correctly, then everything built upon the simple 
things is at risk of being wrong. As Keynes put it: "...the error is to be found not in 
the superstructure, which has been erected with great care for logical consistency, 
but in a lack of clearness and of generality in the premisses." 
 
Erosion and De-rosion 
 
Table 1 presents compound 
annual growth rate figures for the 
three debt surges identified by 
Scott Sumner, and the two 
intervening remissions. 
 
Growth rates for CMDEBT in the 
surge periods beginning 1952, 
1984, and 2000 are certainly high. But note that the growth rate of the apparent 
remission beginning in 1964 is also very high. It is higher, in fact, than Sumner’s 
third surge. 
 
But during that third surge, the growth rate of nominal GDP was only about half the 
rate of debt growth. During the first remission, by contrast, the growth of nominal 
Table 1 
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GDP (at 9.3%) very nearly equaled the growth of debt. The ratio of debt to GDP 
appears very different in the two cases.  For the period beginning in 1964, the ratio 
shows almost no increase at all. This creates the false appearance of a significant 
reduction of debt growth. In truth, the significant change was in Nominal GDP. 
 
As Sumner himself said in a different context, “A few of us market monetarists 
argued that you also needed to look at the denominator of the debt/income ratio, 
not just the numerator."8 
 
Let us look now at real debt relative to real GDP, where each year's addition to 
debt is inflation-adjusted separately based on that year's price level, a calculation 
called Incremental Data Adjustment: 
 
 
 
The blue line is the same that Krugman presented, as seen in Figures 1 and 2. 
You can still see a hint of the face in profile -- the nose, the chin, the forehead. 
This is CMDEBT relative to GDP, expressed as a percent, straight out of St. Louis. 
Nominal divided by nominal. 
 
The red line is real CMDEBT divided by real GDP. It uses incremental adjustment 
of debt, and aggregate adjustment of GDP. The red line runs higher than the blue 
because inflation erodes debt and this graph shows it. Just a glance at Figure 6 is 
sufficient to verify that the great flat spot of the Great Inflation, so clearly visible in 
the blue line, is altogether absent from the red line. 
                                            
8 http://www.themoneyillusion.com/?p=13140 
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Picture a straight-line trend drawn for the red, real debt data. It would show debt 
growth only slightly above trend during Sumner's 1952-1964 and 1984-1991 surge 
periods, and slightly below trend during the 1964-1984 remission.  
 
 
 
 
 
The flat spot so clearly visible on the blue line from the mid-1960s to the mid-
1980s is absent from the red. 
 
The red line -- incremental real debt relative to aggregate real GDP – also shows a 
striking similarity to the "compound annual growth rate" numbers in Table 1.9 
Given a debt growth trend of about 10% per year, the table shows CMDEBT 
growth slightly above trend during Sumner's 1952-1964 and 1984-1991 surge 
periods, and slightly below trend during the 1964-1984 remission. Figure 7 and 
Table 1 show the same pattern. 
 
The table shows there was no remission of debt growth during the Great Inflation, 
and the graph confirms the fact. 
 
 
                                            
9 The Excel spreadsheet supporting Table 1 is available via this URL:  
https://docs.google.com/open?id=0B-pyd4Usl6QkZElBd3hSd1l6dTQ 
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It is a simple matter now, to visualize the erosion of debt. Figure 8 shows the blue 
line from Figure 7, as a percent of the red line from Figure 7: 
 
 
 
 
If we wish to consider the erosion of debt by inflation, it is necessary to see debt in 
the context of income. “Debt relative to GDP” graphs show debt in the context of 
income. Figure 8 shows the ratio of two such graphs. It shows the effect of inflation 
on the ratio of debt to income. 
 
Figure 8 shows nominal values as a percent of real values. The nominal values 
show a striking fall during the Great Inflation of 1965-1984. That fall was a result of 
inflation. That fall was “erosion” of debt. The incremental adjustment of debt allows 
us to see it. 
 
Debt accumulating since 1950 held more than 85% of its real value until the mid-
1960s. It rapidly lost value during the Great Inflation, the number falling to less 
than 55% by 1984. Thereafter, erosion reversed its course. 
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Conclusion 
 
There are two topics that run through this paper. One is Sumner's "debt surge" 
analysis. The other is the calculation of inflation-adjusted debt. How are these 
topics related? The ratio under consideration by Sumner and others is the ratio of 
debt to GDP. Inflation affects both debt and GDP. So a question is forced upon us: 
Does inflation affect debt and GDP equally? 
 
By chance, perhaps, the idea of reducing debt by a policy of increasing inflation 
has lately been circulating. Reducing debt by increasing inflation has been called 
the "erosion" of debt. 
 
But if inflation can "erode" debt, then surely inflation must affect debt and income 
differently. Our question answered, new questions are forced upon us: Why do our 
graphs fail to show the erosion? How can this problem be corrected? What will the 
corrected graphs show? 
 
This paper is an attempt to answer these questions. 
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